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Abstract 
Creative works are now increasingly distributed as digital “content” through the internet, and copyright law has created  
powerful incentives to monitor and control these flows. This paper analyzes the surveillance industry that has emerged 
as a result. Copyright surveillance systems identify copyright infringement online and identify persons to hold responsi-
ble for infringing acts. These practices have raised fundamental questions about the nature of identification and attrib-
ution on the internet, as well as the increasing use of algorithms to make legal distinctions. New technologies have 
threatened the profits of some media industries through copyright infringement, but also enabled profitable forms of 
mass copyright surveillance and enforcement. Rather than a system of perfect control, copyright enforcement contin-
ues to be selective and uneven, but its broad reach results in systemic harm and provides opportunities for exploita-
tion. It is only by scrutinizing copyright surveillance practices and copyright enforcement measures that we can evalu-
ate these consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
Much of our daily lives now involve interacting with 
digital “content”. The relationships we have with these 
digital goods are governed in part by intellectual prop-
erty rights, and a new industry has developed to take 
advantage of this legal fact. The copyright surveillance 
industry monitors the distribution and use of copy-
righted works, identifies instances of copyright in-
fringement, and responds against allegedly infringing 
uses and individuals. Dedicated companies use auto-
mated methods to operate at enormous scale, scan-
ning millions of hours of audio and video each day, and 
bringing suit against hundreds of thousands of individ-
uals each year. The questions I am posing are: how are 
the data packets and digital fragments passing through 
our computer networks identified as copyrighted con-
tent? How are these digital flows traced to identifiable 
individuals, and how are persons held responsible for 
internet traffic? What are the consequences of these 
determinations for data flows as well as people?  
In short then, my research questions are about 
identification based on digital traces. One set deals 
with identifying traffic flows and content as intellectual 
property, the second set deals with identifying people 
and holding them accountable for traffic flows. Traffic 
and content are identified through algorithmic compar-
isons to known “signatures” or characteristics. Individ-
uals can be identified by comparing numeric identifiers 
(IP addresses) recorded by monitoring software to logs 
maintained by internet service providers. Both meth-
ods can result in misidentification and reduce the com-
plexities of copyright law to opaque decisions made by 
automated systems. My paper concludes by analyzing 
copyright trolling, a specific kind of surveillance and en-
forcement that combines the two forms of identifica-
tion (of content and persons) in a particularly exploita-
tive manner. I argue that systemic harms result from 
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today’s wide-ranging copyright regimes, although cop-
yright’s enforcement remains contingent and uneven. 
The internet has been seen as a threat to copyright, 
but copyright surveillance and enforcement technolo-
gies have also come a long way in the internet era, and 
are now the tools of a profitable industry. 
Copyright is a convoluted body of law with strange 
consequences for a digitally-networked society. It justi-
fies constraints on our behavior, but is also routinely 
violated as we go about our daily lives (Greenberg, 
2014, pp. 82-83). Copyright allows people and institu-
tions to claim a monopoly in the use of a piece of writ-
ing, or an image, or the tiniest fragment of recorded 
sound. It enforces scarcity by restricting copying—an 
act that is essential to human creativity (Cohen, 2012, 
ch. 4) and also what our computers and networks are 
designed to do best. Because of this, digital networks 
have threatened copyright, but they also allow for per-
vasive forms of copyright surveillance and enforcement 
that have become the business model of a dedicated 
industry. The sweeping scope of this industry has dis-
rupted the traditional “equilibrium” of copyright’s un-
der-enforcement (Balganesh, 2013b; Lessig, 2001, pp. 
249-250). Copyright can now be enforced against per-
sons and actions that would have previously escaped 
copyright owners’ attention, but this enforcement is 
uneven and inconsistent. Rather than seeking total 
control over the distribution of creative works, copy-
right enforcement is selective, tolerating some uses 
and intervening against others. This is because copy-
right depends on private actors bringing forward claims 
of infringement, and the pursuit of such claims is not 
always advantageous or desirable. On the other hand, 
some of the actors described below have built busi-
nesses dedicated to pursuing “profit-based litigation” 
(DeBriyn, 2012) and demanding monetary settlements 
from scores of alleged infringers. 
Copyright surveillance is an international business, 
and the copyright enforcement actions that follow an 
identification of infringement are often carried out 
without state involvement. But state-backed legal re-
gimes remain in the background, with their threats of 
liability and sovereign violence. The internet some-
times still seems like a lawless place that frustrates 
state controls, but it consists of physical networks 
based in territories and jurisdictions. It is these net-
works’ territorial basis that allows the state-backed 
monopolies of copyright to have any meaningful effect. 
This also makes copyright and the industries it supports 
vulnerable to legal and political reforms. 
2. Surveilling Digital Flows for Intellectual Property 
Much of the data circulating through our networks can 
be claimed as the intellectual property of some person 
or legal entity. Any unauthorized use or reproduction 
of this data can therefore be a violation of “intellectual 
property rights”. The rightsholders of this digital con-
tent are often part of massive industries (most notably 
the music and film industries) that have turned their 
attention to the internet since the 1990s. As a conse-
quence, a new industry has developed to offer copy-
right surveillance and enforcement as a service. This is 
an industry that depends on the fact of infringement to 
support its existence (Lobato & Thomas, 2013), even as 
it ostensibly fights to stop it. 
Copyright was originally developed to regulate pub-
lishers and booksellers dealing in unauthorized copies, 
but today all of our computers make and circulate cop-
ies of cultural goods. Before home computers and the 
internet, a great deal of copying and circulation also 
took place on a regular basis. People made photocop-
ies, VHS and cassette recordings, sang popular lyrics, 
and repurposed melodies. But this behavior largely es-
caped the notice of copyright owners. It was ephemer-
al, dispersed, impossible to track and difficult to con-
trol. The internet is different. Its traffic is visible by 
default, and content can be accessed around the 
world. The amount of internet traffic that arguably in-
fringes copyright has become so large that human in-
tervention cannot possibly keep up with it. 
Fortunately for copyright owners, we now live in an 
age of algorithmic surveillance and algorithmic en-
forcement (Depoorter & Walker, 2013, pp. 333-335). 
Because algorithms are poor at adjudicating the intri-
cacies of copyright law, these systems regularly gener-
ate false positives (see Depoorter & Walker, 2013, p. 
335; Katyal, 2009, pp. 414-415). But they are effective 
enough to serve the interests of copyright owners, and 
are having a massive effect on the availability of online 
content. Algorithmically-selected links are now hauled 
off the web by the million, and with the assistance of 
internet service providers (ISPs), thousands of allegedly 
infringing individuals can be identified and threatened 
by the agents of copyright owners (copyright surveil-
lance companies and law firms).  
Below, I outline the global scale of the copyright 
surveillance and enforcement industry and analyze 
some of its common practices. This analysis is fur-
thered by internal emails and documents from Medi-
aDefender—once one of the industry’s most notable 
companies. While MediaDefender surveilled peer-to-
peer networks, algorithmic copyright surveillance and 
enforcement is increasingly built-in to internet ser-
vices, with YouTube’s Content ID system being the 
most notable example. My paper discusses the case of 
a video caught by Content ID’s extra-judicial copyright 
enforcement system, before closing with a more recent 
trend, in which BitTorrent surveillance services have 
been used to drive profit-seeking copyright lawsuits in 
several countries. But first, I relate my interest in iden-
tification and data flows to previous work in the fields 
of internet and surveillance studies, where social theo-
ry has taken different approaches to related problems. 
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3. Digital Identification and Social Theory 
Surveillance scholars have long been interested in what 
Clarke (1988) called “dataveillance”: the surveillance of 
data generated by persons, and the tracking of persons 
through data (see Elmer, 2004, pp. 36-39). In one influ-
ential contribution to surveillance studies, Haggerty 
and Eriscson (2000, pp. 611-614) discuss how persons 
and their bodies are transformed into data, generating 
so-called “data doubles” that are then used as the basis 
of discriminations among populations. But a great deal 
of copyright surveillance is not interested in monitoring 
persons or populations. In these cases, the targets of 
surveillance and intervention are traffic flows—not 
people. Surveillance companies and their monitoring 
algorithms are often unconcerned about the identities 
of the persons that can be linked to, or held responsi-
ble for this traffic. The goal is to discriminate among 
content and act against anything identified as in-
fringement, rather than against the infringing party. 
The consequences of this kind of copyright en-
forcement are not limited to some separate realm of 
data or “pure virtuality” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 
611). While the distinction between online and offline, 
or digital and physical can still have its uses, it is the 
problematic link between them that deserves more fo-
cus. Increasingly, the trend in social theory has been 
away from “digital dualism” (particularly the dichotomy 
of “real” and “virtual”) and towards an appreciation of 
how our reality is constituted through digital technolo-
gies and embodied experience, or the relationship be-
tween bodies and code (Jurgenson, 2012; Wellman & 
Haythornthwaite, 2002). YouTube videos do not reside 
and circulate in cyberspace. They are part of our world, 
and when a video is blocked there can be very real and 
material consequences for the persons involved (as 
seen in the Lansdowne Library case discussed below). 
The other kind of copyright surveillance discussed 
herein does indeed target people through data, but 
approaches its problem from the opposite direction 
typically of interest to surveillance studies. Rather than 
“abstracting human bodies from their territorial set-
tings and separating them into a series of discrete 
flows” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 606), the process I 
am interested in here is how these digital flows are at-
tributed to human bodies, or how people can be identi-
fied by “suturing or coupling of pieces of information in 
disjunctive time and scattered spaces” (Monahan, 
2009, p. 158). The specific example of this process con-
sidered herein is “copyright trolling”, in which an IP ad-
dress linked to file-sharing activity must be translated 
into a street address and a particular resident (typical-
ly, the internet subscriber). This translation cannot be 
achieved simply through technical means—there is no 
method that an outside observer can use to inde-
pendently pin the IP address (used to route packets of 
information) to an individual residence. While copy-
right surveillance companies can monitor file-sharing 
traffic and record the IP addresses of the devices in-
volved, they must secure the compliance of an ISP to 
correlate these digital addresses with subscribers’ 
street addresses. Typically, this compliance is achieved 
under the weight of the law governing the territory in 
question. 
These concerns of copyright surveillance are related 
to two fundamental problems of our networked age. 
The first problem is control over the cultural objects 
and the information circulating through our networks 
(see Poster, 2006, p. 186). In other words, how internet 
controls can be achieved, and to what effect. The sec-
ond problem is holding individuals accountable for data 
traffic, or how digital records can be sutured together 
to identify a person “behind” the internet traffic (see 
Poster, 2006, pp. 113-116). While these questions are 
now fundamental concerns for a variety of actors, it is 
important to understand how copyright surveillance 
and enforcement companies have taken to answering 
them, given the systemic harms that copyright regimes 
are capable of producing (see Cohen, 2012, ch. 4). 
4. Copyright Surveillance at a Glance 
As described above, copyright surveillance has two 
basic targets: content and persons (see Table 1 below). 
The vast majority of copyright surveillance does not 
aim to identify infringing individuals. Instead, algorith-
mic surveillance is used on a massive scale to identify 
copyrighted content by comparing digital fragments to 
particular “signatures”. This involves systematically 
monitoring file-sharing protocols or “crawling” web-
sites. The algorithms tasked with this surveillance look 
for certain file names or other characteristics of the 
content being distributed online, and compare these to 
a database of known copyrighted content. What hap-
pens when the algorithm detects potential infringe-
ment depends on the party conducting the surveillance 
(or more likely, the party paying for it as a service). As-
suming that this party is a copyright owner, they may 
do nothing at all. Knowing what is being downloaded 
or shared across the internet can be useful infor-
mation. Companies that provide copyright surveillance 
often promote their services as a way to gather market 
information or “business intelligence” (Lobato & 
Thomas, 2013). However, my main interest is copyright 
surveillance that is geared toward intervention. This 
can include having the content removed, making it 
more difficult to access, or targeting the persons alleg-
edly infringing copyright. Individuals can be targeted 
for lawsuits, or be subject to private enforcement re-
gimes like the US Copyright Alert System (Zimmerman, 
2014), which (like Canada’s “notice-and-notice” sys-
tem, see Tarantino, 2012) notifies internet subscribers 
when their IP address has been linked to infringing ac-
tivity. 
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Table 1. Two basic types of copyright surveillance and 
associated enforcement. 
Target Means of 
Identification 
Possible 
Interventions 
Examples 
Content Comparing file 
properties to a 
known 
signature 
Takedown 
notices, 
automated 
filtering, traffic 
disruption 
DMCA 
takedowns, 
YouTube 
Content ID, file 
interdiction 
(MediaDefender) 
Persons Recording IP 
addresses and 
reconciling 
these with an 
ISP’s logs 
Deterrent/educ
ational notices, 
degraded 
internet service, 
lawsuits 
HADOPI, 
Canadian notice-
and-notice, US 
Copyright Alert 
System, RIAA 
file-sharing 
lawsuits, 
copyright trolling 
Copyright surveillance is almost entirely the domain of 
private industry. While the French internet copyright 
regime (HADOPI) created a government agency dedi-
cated to enforcement, the system relies on a private 
company to monitor the country’s internet traffic (see 
Bridy, 2011, pp. 733-735). The copyright surveillance 
industry is modest in size (a large monitoring and en-
forcement company might have a few dozen employ-
ees), but it monitors an enormous scope of online ac-
tivity and facilitates sweeping legal interventions. Some 
copyright owners employ small surveillance and en-
forcement firms and achieve massive reach by leverag-
ing algorithmic methods (Farivar, 2012). Monitoring 
the public or quasi-public internet for copyrighted con-
tent can in theory be achieved at scale by anyone, in-
cluding academics (Chothia, Cova, Novakovic, & Toro, 
2013; Zhang, Dhungel, Wu, & Ross, 2011). Copyright 
surveillance companies do use specialized software, 
but they generally do not enjoy any privileged access to 
internet traffic. 
The first of these copyright surveillance companies 
were founded in 1999 and 2000, during the rapid rise 
of the file-sharing service Napster (Doan, 2000) and the 
accompanying legal campaign to stop internet piracy. 
For several years this campaign by the music industry 
generated lawsuits against tens of thousands of US in-
dividuals accused of online infringement. Over the 
course of the mid to late 2000s these efforts were 
largely abandoned. Today they can be recognized as a 
failed attempt to criminalize widespread and normal-
ized behavior (Bachmann & Jaishankar, 2011; Harris, 
2012). However, copyright surveillance has continued 
towards other ends, such as targeting web services and 
search engines. In recent years, mass file-sharing law-
suits have resurfaced, but these have generally been 
oriented towards generating revenue for minor copy-
right owners rather than deterring infringement of ma-
jor creative works. 
Deeper insight into the copyright surveillance in-
dustry was made possible in 2007, when six months of 
internal files and emails from US-based MediaDefender 
appeared online (see Roth, 2008; Zetter, 2007). At the 
time of this supposed hack of the company, Medi-
aDefender was one of the more notable firms in the 
industry, having been purchased for $43 million in 
2005 (Mennecke, 2005). The company was working to 
expand into a number of business opportunities, in-
cluding helping to identify individuals sharing child 
pornography, and its own video download service. 
However, the majority of MediaDefender’s business 
activity involved “protecting” particular titles for copy-
right owners by monitoring several file-sharing net-
works for newly released or soon-to-be released titles. 
When these files were found, downloads could be dis-
rupted through various means. These included flooding 
file-sharing networks with “decoy” or “spoof” versions 
(which appear genuine, but are instead unplayable, 
limited to promotional content, or redirect to an ap-
proved source. See Anderson, 2007; Katyal, 2003, pp. 
356-358).  
MediaDefender did not generally collect evidence 
or IP addresses for use in litigation, but it did record 
and share data on file-sharing for other purposes. 
These included answering queries from copyright own-
ers about the amount of file-sharing in a particular 
country or region. In two e-mail exchanges, rightshold-
ers asked the company about the popularity of individ-
ual songs being considered for release as singles. Me-
diaDefender’s clients included some of the world’s 
biggest copyright owners (Universal, Paramount, Sony 
BMG). One “small monitoring contract” with a major 
record label paid $10,000 a month to monitor three file 
sharing networks for the presence of particular files. 
Different levels of protection, for different lengths of 
time, were offered for between $5,000 and $15,000 
per title (Anderson, 2007). In one email exchange dur-
ing 2007, it was estimated that the company of approx-
imately 60 employees was working on around 3,000 
projects at once, with company servers pushing out 
around 3 billion decoy and spoof files a day. 
MediaDefender’s fortunes declined following the 
compromise of its files in 2007, and the company even-
tually went out of business. But the information dis-
closed about its operations can still tell us several 
things. First, even a small firm can monitor and inter-
vene against file sharing on a massive scale. Medi-
aDefender’s methodology combined algorithmic dis-
crimination with human judgment, but it was the 
algorithms that enabled its broad scope. The following 
section elaborates on how this algorithmic copyright 
enforcement has evolved since MediaDefender’s hey-
day, through built-in systems such as YouTube’s Con-
tent ID. Afterwards, I will turn to the topic of copyright 
surveillance for the purposes of personal identification.  
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5. Caught in the YouTube Vortex 
In 2012 the Lansdowne Public Library and its Teen Advi-
sory Board in Pennsylvania made a video promoting 
reading and uploaded it to YouTube. The video parodied 
Michael Jackson’s “Beat It” (Read It, 2012), featuring 
teens dancing and singing about reading. In less than 
three days the video was identified as potentially infring-
ing copyright and taken down from YouTube. In their ef-
forts to restore the video over the following year, library 
staff would need to navigate the tangles of copyright 
law, content ownership, and algorithmic enforcement.  
It was unclear who had been responsible for the 
takedown in the first place, since YouTube’s takedown 
system is automated, but operates under the direction 
of copyright owners. The system initially referred the 
library to Warner/Chappell Music (Mengers, 2013), but 
Jackson’s music has been transferred to Sony/ATV. The 
librarian who had filmed the video filled out the forms 
to appeal the decision and sought licensing from Sony 
(Schwartz, 2012). She also made personal appeals to 
Sony, which included travelling to New York and trying 
to enter Sony’s offices. At one point, Sony claimed that 
they wanted the lyrics in the video changed. Later the 
company allowed to video to be put online, but only on 
the library’s website and not on any other site, and only 
for a limited time period (Mengers, 2012). After national 
news media began covering the story, Sony moved to al-
low the video to be re-instated (Schwartz, 2012).  
Was the video infringing? Was it fair use (see 
Schwartz, 2012)? Because of the legal uncertainties 
and gray areas of copyright law, these legal distinctions 
can only be made by a court (see Katyal, 2009, pp. 411-
412; Lee, 2008). But the absence of a court’s judgment 
did not prevent an algorithmic judgment. Months later, 
the same YouTube video had its audio muted through 
an automated enforcement action. Once again, an al-
gorithm had been tripped, silencing the library and its 
teens. Sony denied being behind the muting. According 
to the Library’s director, Sony claimed that they did not 
have the power to restore the audio, and that the con-
tent had been caught in the “YouTube vortex” (New 
Media Rights, 2013). The library phoned YouTube but 
could not speak to a human being (Mengers, 2013). One 
of the librarians eventually submitted a claim through 
YouTube’s online appeal process, but she needed the 
help of a lawyer to craft a fair use argument which 
would be effective in having the audio restored 
(Mengers, 2013; New Media Rights, 2013). What even-
tually turned out to be a copyright success story re-
quired exceptional efforts on the part of library staff, as 
well as legal help to properly engage with YouTube’s en-
forcement regime and appeal its algorithms.  
6. Scan and Notice 
Online copyright enforcement is generally meant to 
deny or restrict the availability of content. Denial can 
be achieved either by directly disrupting access (as in 
MediaDefender’s interdiction efforts), through built-in 
enforcement regimes such as YouTube’s (see below), 
or by using existing copyright laws to issue what are 
known as “takedown notices” for content (Lobato & 
Thomas, 2013, p. 615). Millions of pieces of content are 
targeted by such notices every week, which can be ef-
fective wherever ISPs and online services are required 
to take them seriously. The processing of takedown no-
tices is crucial for these companies to maintain “safe 
harbor” protection under the copyright laws of the US, 
EU, and Canada (among other nations, see Fernández-
Díez, 2014; Tarantino, 2012). Safe harbor protects 
companies providing internet services against liability 
for infringement carried out by their users. However, 
this protection often only applies to companies as long 
as they remain unaware that their users are infringing 
copyright (Fernández-Díez, 2014, pp. 67-69). Under 
safe harbor, service providers have an incentive to limit 
what they know about their users’ activities. When a 
legitimate takedown notice arrives informing them of 
infringement on their service, service providers are 
obliged to take action. 
As a consequence, copyright surveillance compa-
nies have been algorithmically flagging infringement 
across the web and sending a growing deluge of notic-
es to major content hosting platforms. Online service 
providers have to decide whether each notice is legiti-
mate and should be complied with. Google processed a 
weekly average of between seven and nine million 
URLs in late 2014 (Google, 2015), with each request 
from a major copyright owner typically listing thou-
sands of URLs for removal. Just as the employees of 
copyright surveillance companies use automated scan-
ning and algorithmic discrimination to create these 
lists, Google uses its proprietary blend of algorithms 
and human review to decide which takedown notices 
should be complied with, and which should be rejected 
(Google rejected less than 1% of these notices in 2013, 
see Google, 2014, p. 13). 
YouTube (owned by Google) maintains a similar sys-
tem for handling takedown notices, but also operates 
its own automated system for identifying infringing 
content, known as Content ID. This proactive system of 
identifying infringement was developed while YouTube 
was embroiled in a billion-dollar lawsuit with Viacom 
(which accused YouTube of not taking action against 
videos that it knew were infringing, see Zimmerman, 
2014, pp. 264-265). Rightsholders provide YouTube 
with “reference files” of their content, and the site 
scans each uploaded video looking for a match. If Con-
tent ID matches an uploaded video to one of its 25 mil-
lion or so active reference files, the copyright owner 
can choose to block the video (or mute its audio), show 
ads, or track its viewership (Google, 2014). 
The algorithms behind Content ID have been re-
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fined over the years, and its appeals process has been 
elaborated and extended (La Rosa, 2014; Zimmerman, 
2014, p. 272). Still, Content ID’s proactive orientation 
exceeds the requirements of US law, and Google an-
nounced that in implementing it the company “goes 
above and beyond [its] legal responsibilities” (King, 
2007). Google has created an extensive copyright mon-
itoring and enforcement system that operates without 
court involvement, in part to keep the company from 
facing another massive lawsuit by rightsholders. In its 
effort to proactively police copyright, YouTube pro-
cesses a staggering amount of video through Content ID 
(Google, 2014), and the system has helped channel over 
a billion dollars in advertising revenue to copyright own-
ers (La Rosa, 2014). But those caught on the wrong side 
of YouTube’s judgments, as in the Lansdowne Library 
case (see also Tarantino, 2012) have had to suffer the 
costs, without the transparency and due process that a 
court could provide (Zimmerman, 2014, p. 273). 
Built-in monitoring and copyright enforcement sys-
tems are increasingly the norm for popular media-
sharing websites (La Rosa, 2014). With growing num-
bers of people creating and distributing content online 
(Poster, 2006, pp. 244-249), these private copyright en-
forcement regimes are having a major effect in control-
ling the distribution of cultural goods. Algorithmic 
judgments may not carry the same weight as court or-
ders, but they are effectively the law of these digital 
domains (see Lessig, 2006). However, some companies 
have combined the use of algorithmic surveillance and 
discrimination with the enforcement powers of the 
courts. They do so in order to link identifications of 
copyright infringement to individual persons. An entire 
business model has developed in recent years around 
identifying individuals tied to copyright infringement 
and compelling them to pay large penalties. The result, 
known as copyright trolling, might be the most exploi-
tative use of copyright enforcement in the digitally-
networked era. 
7. Lawsuits and BitTorrent Trolls 
Identifying persons is a relatively minor concern for the 
type of copyright surveillance described earlier: what 
matters is whether internet traffic includes copyrighted 
content, and whether it can be controlled. However, in 
the early 2000s many major US copyright owners felt 
they could achieve control through deterrence—by 
identifying and suing thousands of individuals accused 
of sharing songs. Their efforts failed (DeBriyn, 2012, pp. 
84–85), and for a time copyright owners’ lawsuits 
shifted from individuals to institutions (like YouTube 
and The Pirate Bay) that allegedly facilitated infringe-
ment. But by 2010, a new approach took hold among 
some of the more marginal copyright owners and their 
lawyers. Courts once again saw thousands of persons 
targeted in infringement suits, and judges were asked 
to help identify these defendants on the basis of IP ad-
dresses. 
The actors bringing these sorts of suits are often 
described as “copyright trolls”, but there are disagree-
ments about just what distinguishes a troll from a more 
legitimate plaintiff. Trolling operations vary and are le-
gally opportunistic, and it has proven difficult to define 
copyright trolls in a way that captures more than a por-
tion of such operations (see Sag, 2015). Because of this, 
I avoid labeling any specific companies as copyright 
trolls. Instead (and largely in agreement with Sag, 
2015), I refer to copyright trolling as a practice—one 
that threatens large numbers of individuals with copy-
right infringement claims, with the primary goal of 
profiting from settlements (or default judgments) ra-
ther than proceeding to trial on the merits of a case 
(see Curran, 2013).  
While major copyright owners can engage in 
trolling, they generally prefer not to. This is typically 
the domain of smaller companies that do not receive 
large profits through sales and licensing, and see set-
tlements as an easy way of generating revenue from 
individuals who are not paying for their works. Trolling 
is “profit-based litigation” (DeBriyn, 2012, p. 86), and 
to be successful it depends on accused infringers fearing 
the price of statutory damages and settling for smaller 
amounts. In the large subset of copyright trolling cases 
dealing with pornography, the pressure on defendants 
can be amplified by the fear of being publicly associated 
with pornography titles (Curran, 2013). 
Copyright trolling is a strategy that depends on link-
ing internet traffic to particular individuals, which is 
where copyright surveillance companies come into 
play. These companies monitor online traffic, record 
the IP addresses involved in sharing certain files, and 
hand the list to a law firm. The law firm then under-
takes the next step by approaching the ISP that as-
signed the IP addresses, and having the ISP consult its 
logs to determine which address was assigned to which 
subscriber at a given time. Frequently, this requires a 
court to compel the ISP to disclose the subscriber’s in-
formation (Anderson, 2010). The copyright surveillance 
company does not enter into the process again unless 
the plaintiff is forced to further substantiate the claim 
of infringement before a court.  
Copyright trolling (sometimes called “speculative 
invoicing”) is often thought of as a particularly Ameri-
can practice, since statutory damages in the US can be 
up to $150,000 per work infringed, and the average 
cost of defending a copyright infringement case 
through trial (excluding judgment and awards) ranges 
between $384,000 and $2 million, depending on the 
size of the copyright claim (Am. Intellectual Law Ass’n, 
of the Economic Prop. Report Survey 2011, cited in 
Balganesh, 2013a, p. 2280; Depoorter & Walker, 2013). 
This makes settling for between $1500 and $5000 a 
more attractive option, which has led many commen-
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tators to liken the process to extortion or “legal ran-
som” (Curran, 2013). However, the legal strategy of 
copyright trolling has also seen extensive use in the UK 
(Golden Eye [International] Ltd. & Anor v Telefonica UK 
Ltd., 2012) and may have been pioneered in Germany 
(Lobato & Thomas, 2013, p. 618; Roettgers, 2011). In 
2010, tens of thousands of individuals had been sued in 
this manner in the US (Anderson, 2010). By 2011 the 
number exceeded 200,000 (Ernesto, 2011) and was 
possibly much higher in Germany (Roettgers, 2011). By 
2014, copyright trolling cases made up the majority of 
copyright cases filed in several US federal court dis-
tricts (Sag, 2015). No one knows just how many indi-
viduals have settled in these cases or how much money 
has been collected in total, although millions of dollars 
have clearly been paid to different trolling operations. 
While some trolling operations have specialized in 
the copying of images, news articles, and audio sam-
ples (Curran, 2013; Polonsky, 2012), my focus is on 
trolling cases that target file-sharing on BitTorrent. The 
BitTorrent protocol rose to popularity in the mid-2000s 
as a way of distributing and sharing large files, which 
made it ideal for videos. Since this protocol operates as 
a distributed system and has no central point of con-
trol, it cannot be shut down by court order in the same 
way as earlier file-sharing systems such as Napster and 
Kazaa. Traffic on BitTorrent is highly visible however, 
since each downloaded file is received as many small 
pieces from numerous users (all of whom constitute a 
“swarm”), and each of these contributors can be iden-
tified by an IP address. BitTorrent activity can be moni-
tored through a number of means (Chothia et al., 
2013), but in essence, it is by joining a swarm that one 
can record the IP addresses of all those who are also 
participating in it. 
Just as the activities and IP addresses of download-
ers and uploaders are largely visible on BitTorrent, so 
are the activities of copyright surveillance companies 
(Chothia et al., 2013; Ernesto, 2012). However, we 
know little about their methods, since these have rare-
ly been submitted as evidence and examined in court. 
Copyright trolling cases, by and large, do not proceed 
to trial. This might be because the costs of litigating a 
case exceed what might be recovered as a settlement, 
but also because of the risk of an unfavorable judg-
ment against the troll. The information obtained 
through monitoring BitTorrent is relevant primarily for 
the “discovery phase” of a suit, where a court order is 
sought to compel an ISP to identify its subscribers. 
With the identities of alleged infringers in hand, a troll 
can then proceed to demand settlements from them, 
and the information used to make these demands 
need never be assessed as evidence in a court of law. 
In a typical copyright trolling case, the subscriber’s 
name and home address is all that is needed to send 
out a settlement letter (demanding payment of a few 
thousand dollars to make the suit disappear). However, 
depending on the plaintiff and the defendant’s actions, 
further investigations can be carried out. In some US 
copyright trolling cases, defendants arguing their inno-
cence have undertaken polygraph tests or had their 
computers searched by forensic examiners (Malibu 
Media LLC, 2014). Defendants in these cases must de-
cide how far they are willing to go to demonstrate their 
innocence (versus paying the settlement), and plaintiffs 
must decide how far they are willing to go to pursue a 
settlement or judgment (houstonlawy3r, 2013). 
Ultimately, the copyright troll business model de-
pends on legal regimes and judges that can facilitate 
these sorts of actions. In the US, judges have by and 
large granted the court orders sought to identify sub-
scribers, but legal decisions since 2013 have limited the 
ability of trolling cases to sweep up thousands of indi-
viduals at once (houstonlawy3r, 2013; Ren, 2013; Sag, 
2015). The most egregious trolling practices have also 
faced the threat of legal sanctions in US courts (Has-
lach, 2013). In a significant UK case, a judge granted a 
court order to identify suspected infringers, but im-
posed conditions on the manner in which settlement 
offers could be made (Golden Eye ([nternational] Ltd. & 
Anor v Telefonica UK Ltd., 2012). Similarly, an attempt 
to identify thousands of subscribers in Canada was met 
with reservations from a judge who, citing privacy con-
cerns and the “spectre” of the copyright troll, imposed 
conditions that would limit the opportunities to profit 
from settlement demands (Voltage Pictures LLC v. John 
Doe and Jane Doe, 2014). The case was subsequently 
cited to justify similar conditions in a precedent-setting 
Australian file-sharing suit (Dallas Buyers Club LLC v 
iiNet Ltd., 2015). 
While some of the most exploitative opportunities 
for trolling have been foreclosed by the above judg-
ments, a few copyright surveillance companies have 
found ways to secure compliance from ISPs to identify 
alleged infringers without proceeding through the 
courts. The most notable of these has been Rightscorp, 
which pursues settlements for just $20, albeit on a mass 
scale (Mullin, 2014). In Canada, CEG-TEK has pursued 
somewhat larger settlements by taking advantage of the 
country’s new copyright enforcement regime, which re-
quires ISPs to forward notices from copyright owners to 
subscribers (Roberts, 2015). Just as some courts have 
come to oppose copyright trolling, new business models 
based on copyright surveillance and identification are 
being developed to fit changing legal environments. 
8. Pervasive Surveillance, Contingent Enforcement 
Widespread and vigorous copyright enforcement can 
be justified by the harm that infringement causes: re-
ducing profits for artists and creative industries, there-
by limiting incentives for the production of new crea-
tive works. While it is demonstrably false that every 
infringing act results in harm (particularly as some un-
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authorized uses are actively encouraged by copyright 
owners, see Lee, 2008), it is undeniable that forms of 
infringement such as file-sharing have, to some extent, 
been “revenue-depleting” for certain industries (Bridy, 
2011, p. 711). If the aim of copyright is to lessen such 
harm by reducing infringement, then pervasive surveil-
lance and severe enforcement might be legitimate ap-
proaches. If there are reasons to believe that a heavy-
handed approach to copyright enforcement is counter-
productive to this aim (see Bachmann & Jaishankar, 
2011; Harris, 2012), then as with any form of illegality, 
we might debate which kinds of infringement are best 
addressed through which enforcement measures, or to 
what extent the law is being “overenforced” (Bal-
ganesh, 2013b). 
It is not my objective in this paper to determine the 
appropriate balance between the rights of copyright 
owners and users, or how best to combat infringe-
ment. Instead, my interest is in the rise of the copyright 
surveillance industry and its consequences. Digital me-
dia and networks have made it easier than ever for in-
dividuals to copy and distribute copyrighted content, 
but monitoring and enforcement technologies now al-
so have a global reach. Copyright owners previously 
had limited insight into how their works were used and 
distributed (particularly for non-commercial purposes) 
and little ability to control such behavior. But Content 
ID can scan hundreds of years of video fed into 
YouTube each day (Google, 2014), and similar systems 
are being adopted by a growing number of media-
sharing platforms. With limited resources, millions of IP 
addresses connected through BitTorrent can be moni-
tored (Zhang et al., 2011), and the resurgence of mass 
litigation against file-sharers has seen hundreds of 
thousands of these IP addresses brought before courts 
for identification. These developments have dramati-
cally extended areas of contact between individuals 
and copyright owners.  
A number of authors have raised the fear that copy-
right enforcement systems were transforming our 
networked society into a dystopia of total surveillance 
and “perfect regulation” (Lessig, 2006, pp. xiii-xv) or 
“perfect [law] enforcement” (Mulligan, 2008). Howev-
er, while copyright enforcement systems are now 
widely deployed, they form an uneven regulatory 
patchwork that is far from perfect in its discrimina-
tions. In the cases examined above, haphazard contin-
gencies determine whether or not enforcement 
measures come into effect. Content ID does not en-
force all copyright equally (enforcement depends on 
the rightsholder), and BitTorrent trolls can choose 
among legal jurisdictions and ISPs when seeking court 
orders. Many forms of copyright surveillance are not 
tied to any enforcement actions at all, and copyright 
owners frequently tolerate unauthorized use of their 
works for promotional purposes (Lee, 2008).  
Perfect enforcement is therefore an impossible and 
undesirable goal, even for many rightsholders. Instead, 
we see pervasive copyright surveillance and uneven, 
contingent enforcement. As a consequence, individuals 
are left uncertain about which actions will be tolerated 
and which will be pursued as instances of infringement 
(Katyal, 2009, p. 418), or what uses of copyrighted con-
tent qualify as “fair” (Katyal, 2009, pp. 411-413; Lee, 
2008). False positives also occur regularly as automat-
ed systems misidentify content, or copyright owners 
assert illegitimate claims (Depoorter & Walker, 2013). 
Individuals wishing to contest these claims can be left 
in the position of the Lansdowne Library video produc-
ers, unsure of how or where to appeal a judgment. 
Those who are misidentified as infringers by copyright 
trolls are left weighing the price of a settlement against 
the costs of demonstrating their innocence in court 
(Balganesh, 2013a). Copyright enforcement might be 
inconsistent and uncertain, but those caught in its net 
experience significant harms.  
This paper’s selection of cases has been used to 
make three broad points. First, many kinds of mass 
copyright surveillance can be carried out with limited 
resources, and there is sufficient demand for these 
services to support a small, dedicated industry. Surveil-
lance companies like MediaDefender demonstrated 
the vast reach of their algorithmic methods in the early 
2000s, and web giants like YouTube can scale their 
monitoring capabilities to match the vast volumes of 
content passing through their servers. The second 
point is that these algorithmic judgments are inherent-
ly imperfect and unevenly applied, contributing to 
deep uncertainties in copyright enforcement. The harm 
caused when automated methods misidentify or over-
reach against infringement can be significant, as in the 
Lansdowne Library video, and those affected may have 
limited recourse. As a third point, it is important to 
recognize the systematic harms that result from expan-
sive copyright enforcement regimes (Cohen, 2012, ch. 
4), even when these operate within the law. The phe-
nomenon of copyright trolling combines mass copy-
right surveillance and mass litigation, extracting set-
tlements out of as many people as possible, but not 
submitting evidence to the scrutiny of a trial. Such ef-
forts disrupt copyright’s traditional “equilibrium” of 
under-enforcement (Balganesh, 2013b) by pursuing 
non-commercial cases of infringement which were 
largely outside the scope of enforcement before inter-
net technologies facilitated both widespread sharing 
and mass surveillance. Therefore, while uses of inter-
net technologies have harmed the traditional business 
models of some copyright owners, the systematic 
harms enabled by the business of copyright surveil-
lance and enforcement also need to be acknowledged. 
9. Conclusion 
The commercialization of internet activity since the 
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1990s has entailed treating some digital flows as intel-
lectual property, the idea being that much of the con-
tent circulating through the internet has an “owner” 
with exclusive rights to its distribution. The copyright 
surveillance and enforcement industries serve their cli-
ents by identifying copyrighted works and controlling 
their distribution, as well as identifying individuals al-
legedly engaged in infringement. Algorithmic tools are 
used to solve these problems at scale, so that even 
small monitoring firms can have massive reach. There 
is sufficient demand for these services to ensure that 
copyright surveillance and enforcement systems will 
continue to be developed and refined, particularly as 
private enforcement regimes like Content ID are 
adopted across a growing number of online platforms.  
While copyright enforcement is driven by private 
actors, it depends on state authorities and credible 
threats of legal action to compel compliance and assis-
tance from third parties. The legal foundation of these 
efforts makes them vulnerable to changing judicial atti-
tudes, as well as political reforms to copyright regimes. 
Copyright trolling in particular has faced a growing 
backlash in recent years, with some courts limiting or 
imposing supervision over such operations. But innova-
tive new ways have been developed to generate reve-
nue from systematic copyright claims. These kinds of 
exploitative enforcement will remain a danger as long 
as digital flows can easily be attributed to individuals, 
and copyright regimes impose large monetary penal-
ties for commonplace behavior. 
Not all of the concerns discussed in this paper are 
specific to intellectual property rights. Any attempt to 
screen the vast volumes of data in circulation for ille-
gality will require the use of algorithms to make legal 
distinctions, or ways to hold individuals accountable for 
digital flows. But the reason why copyright has been 
such a powerful driver of internet governance debates 
and policies is the large financial interest that media in-
dustries have in controlling the distribution of creative 
works. This same interest now supports a copyright sur-
veillance industry, which in turn enables widespread 
copyright enforcement, along with enforcement’s sys-
temic harms. It can be argued that these harms are the 
price of preserving copyright in the era of digital net-
works, but there are now many examples of how such 
an approach can go too far, and reasons to wonder 
whether this is an appropriate justification. It is only by 
closely attending to the effects of copyright regimes 
and the practices they support that we can make an in-
formed judgment on the best way forward. This re-
quires not just the active interest of scholars, but also 
that copyright regimes (especially algorithmic and ex-
tra-judicial regimes) be open to scrutiny.  
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